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Judicial review is often thought to be an absolute veto, killing leg-

islation with no hope of resurrection. The adoption of judicial review,
therefore, is understood to be a potentially severe qualification to de-

mocratic government. It was this understanding that once drove American progressives such as Theodore Roosevelt to endorse the "judicial
recall" that would have allowed "the people to rule" by overriding
judicial constitutional doctrine;' that led Canada to include the "not-

withstanding" clause in its Charter, shielding legislation from judicial
nullification; and that now spurs some to urge the remaining Westminster systems to resist pressures to curb parliamentary sovereignty
with judicial review.'
But how warranted is this assumption? Creative and persistent
legislators will try to reanimate these statutory corpses, and it is an
open question whether judicial disapproval really lays the issue to rest.
Congress is sometimes quick to try to resuscitate at the federal level
what the Court strikes down at the state level. Often these legislative
exertions are serious only as political theater. The Flag Protection Act

of 1989' and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003' come to

t

Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
1 Theodore Roosevelt, Progressive Principles:Selections from Addresses Made During the
PresidentialCampaign of 1912 276-77 (Progressive National Service 1913).
2
See Canada Constitution Act Part I § 33(1) ("Parliament or the legislature of a province
may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the
Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.").
3
See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement209-312 (Oxford 1999) (arguing against judicial review because it oqcludes rather than overcomes political disagreement).
4
Pub L No 101-131, 103 Stat 777 (1989), codified at 18 USC § 700 (2000). The law sought
to overturn Texas v Johnson,491 US 397 (1989), and was invalidated by United States v Eichman,
496 US 310 (1990).
5
Pub L No 108-105, 117 Stat 1201, to be codified at 18 USC § 1531. The law seeks to
overturn Stenberg v Carhart,530 US 914 (2000), and is currently being litigated. See National
Abortion Federation v Ashcroft, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 4249 (SD NY); Carhartv Ashcroft, 331 F
Supp 2d 805 (D Neb 2004); NationalAbortion Federationv Ashcroft, 330 F Supp 2d 436 (SD NY
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mind. Occasionally the effort seems more serious, even when it becomes a case study in "how not to challenge the Court," as with the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). But RFRA's
death at the Court's hands only provoked Congress to pass the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,' though
that statute was far less ambitious than RFRA. In other instances,
however, Congress has sought to cure a perceived constitutional defect with relatively little effort, such as by the 1994 addition of a jurisdictional hook to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.' Unable to
override the Court, Congress might still circumvent it.
In a thought-provoking addition to the Constitutional Conflicts
series published by Duke University Press, Mitchell Pickerill investigates how Congress reacts to the judicial invalidation of federal statutes. Through a combination of close case studies and large-scale data
analysis, he uncovers how Congress responds to both the presence and
the absence of constitutional scrutiny by the courts. The results give us
new insights into how (and whether) legislators think about the Constitution and a deeper appreciation for how the power of judicial review fits into and affects the broader political system. Focusing particularly on the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival in the 1990s,
Pickerill gives new evidence for valuing judicial safeguards of federalism. More broadly, however, his analysis of the relationship between
Congress and the Court bears close study by those interested in either
judicial review or the Constitution outside the courts, for he challenges basic assumptions held by those on all sides of those debates.
The book has two central tasks. One focuses on the fate of congressional policies struck down by the Supreme Court in the latter
half of the twentieth century. The second examines the extent and nature of congressional deliberation on the Constitution. Each will be
taken up in turn.

2004); Planned ParenthoodFederation ofAmerica v Ashcroft, 320 F Supp 2d 957 (SD Cal 2004);
Planned ParenthoodFederation ofAmerica v Ashcroft, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 20105 (ND Cal).
6
Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb (2000), invalidated by
City of Boerne v Flores,521 US 507 (1997). See Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39
Wm & Mary L Rev 645 (1998) (arguing that, by confronting the Court head-on instead of engaging in a conversation with the Court, Congress ensured that RFRA would be struck down).
7
Pub L No 106-274,114 Stat 803, codified at 42 USC § 2000cc (2000).
8
Pub L No 101-647,104 Stat 4844, codified as amended at 18 USC § 922(q)(1) (2000).The
law was amended by Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2125 (1994) (adding findings of fact as to how
guns affect interstate commerce), but then invalidated by the Supreme Court in United States v
Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995).
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THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

There is a broad class of studies concerned with what happens after initial policy decisions are made by high-level policymakers. The
burst of innovative legislation associated with the Great Society was
soon followed by grave disappointment with how little seemed to

have been accomplished and how often ambitious programs seemed
to have gone awry. To some degree, these disappointments alerted
scholars and policymakers to how little we knew about solving the

difficult social problems of crime, economic inequality, environmental
ills, and the like. But these experiences also suggested how little we

knew about how government works in society. How, as one pioneering
study put it, were "great expectations in Washington [ ] dashed in
Oakland"?9 How, and to what extent, did those policy decisions

change behavior on the ground? How, for example, are legislative
policies actually implemented by "street-level bureaucrats"? 0 Imple-

mentation was itself a political problem, requiring an understanding of
how complex organizations operate and how low-level politics is con-

ducted; in the 1970s a literature focused on problems of implementation developed within the field of public administration, primarily de-

signed to understand how bureaucracies hindered and facilitated policymakers."
Perhaps because the courts are so self-evidently dependent on
others to implement their decisions-they lack the sword, as Alexan-

der Hamilton promised" -scholars

of judicial politics recognized the

need to study the politics of implementation earlier than did scholars
of public policy and administration. These so-called "impact studies"

have been concerned with describing and explaining what happens
after a court renders a decision. The first of them appeared in the late
1950s, just as two developments were occurring-political scientists

interested in law and courts began to separate themselves more dramatically from traditional legal scholarship and became more inter-

9
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation:How Great Expectations
in Washington Are Dashedin Oakland: Or, Why It's Amazing That FederalProgramsWork at All,
This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic
ObserversWho Seek to Build Morals on a Foundationof Ruined Hopes (Berkeley 3d ed 1984).
10 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy:Dilemmas of the Individualin Public Services
(Russell Sage 1980) (examining the policy significance of the discretion necessarily exercised by
very low-level government employees, such as teachers, police officers, and social workers).
11 For a review of the literature, see Susan M. Barrett, Implementation Studies: Time for a
Revival? Personal Reflections on 20 Years of Implementation Studies, 82 Pub Admin 249 (2004);
Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., Research on Policy Implementation:Assessment and Prospects,10 J Pub
Admin Rsrch & Theory 263 (2000).
12 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 523 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed).
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ested in political behavior than in legal doctrine, and the Warren Court
began to issue controversial decisions that were aimed at reforming
established social and political practices, which encountered resis-

tance.'3 In the preface to perhaps the first study of its kind, Gordon
Patric of the University of Illinois, in a symposium inspired by the decision in Brown v Board of Education, noted with amazement that "in
all the vast literature on the high tribunal nothing significant appears
which sets out in detail what impact a Court decision has."'" In examining the aftermath of McCollum v Board of Education,"which declared

unconstitutional the voluntary religious instruction of public school
children in Champaign, Illinois, Patric found that the Court's ruling

was "put into effect in diverse ways, and 'obeyed' to varying degrees,
and that, in some states and communities, it was simply not put into
effect at all."'6

This basic conclusion soon became commonplace. Jack Peltason's
landmark study of how federal district and circuit courts in the South
struggled to implement school desegregation with little success and
little assistance from the Supreme Court established the field." As the
interdisciplinary law and society movement emerged in the 1960s,
"gap studies" measuring the distance between the "law on the books"
and the "law in action" became a staple of its research agenda.'8 Like

13 See Gordon Patric, The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision: Aftermath of the
McCollum Case, 6 J Pub L 455,457 (1957) (describing how McCollum v Board of Education,333
US 203 (1948), which invalidated Illinois' practice of allowing private groups to provide religious
instruction in public school classrooms during school hours, had the narrow result of eliminating
or modifying only religious instruction that occurred both on school premises and during school
hours); Patric, 6 J Pub L at 463 (noting how those who had advocated the practice struck down
by McCollum were most influential in implementing compliance with McCollum); Frank J.
Sorauf, Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53 Am Polit Sci Rev 777
(1959) (providing evidence of noncompliance with Zorach v Clauson, 343 US 306 (1952), which
held that it was constitutionally acceptable for New York schools to allow students to be released
during the school day to attend religious classes off campus, because the public school neither
gave religious instruction on school premises nor used public funding for such religious instruction); Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 Am Polit Sci Rev 1017
(1959) (arguing that the Supreme Court and lower courts engage in reactions and counterreactions, an interchange that might be a valuable check on judicial power).
14 Patric, 6 J Pub L at 455 (cited in note 13).
15 333 US 203 (1948).
16
Patric, 6 J Pub L at 455 (cited in note 13).
17 J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern FederalJudges and School Desegregation (Harcourt, Brace 1961).
18 For a critique of the conceptualization and persistence of this research, see Richard L.
Abel, Redirecting Social Studies of Law, 14 L & Socy Rev 805 (1980) (arguing that researchers
should know in advance that reformist laws will do little to bring about social change, and that
therefore their continued research distracts attention from the law's relation to social stasis);
Austin Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of the Law: On the Unfortunate Persistenceof
a Research Agenda, 9 Legal Stud F 23 (1985) (arguing that the abandonment of research into

20051

James Madison Has Left the Building

1141

the public administration literature on bureaucratic implementation,

the judicial impact studies fed naturally into the study of the role of
courts in the formulation and implementation of public policy. 9 Scholars also branched out to consider the impact of Supreme Court decisions on a host of actors and institutions, including legislatures,0 the
executive branch," lower federal courts,n state courts," affected organilegal effectiveness might allow researchers to recognize that law is much more complex and
powerful as a form of societal control than gap studies have acknowledged).
19 See, for example, Jack W. Peltason, Federal Courts in the Political Process (Random
House 1955) (describing the role of Congress and the president in influencing the course of
judicial decisionmaking and concluding that judges are not more isolated than other players in
the political process); R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act
(Brookings 1983) (analyzing the long-term effects of federal court decisions in shaping environmental policy and finding unforeseen consequences from this policymaking); Robert A. Katzmann, InstitutionalDisability:The Saga of TransportationPolicy for the Disabled 152-87 (Brookings 1986) (analyzing the role of courts in interpreting transportation policy and showing that
courts were less attached to a rights-based approach than either Congress or regulatory agencies); Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions:How PublicLaw Distorts Public Policy (Basic 1989)
(arguing that active judicial oversight of regulatory agencies equates policy preferences with
legal rights and, by privileging "the law" over considerations of policy or consequence, muddles
the debate on substantive questions of policy with legal arguments).
20
For empirical studies of how, if at all, Supreme Court decisions are implemented or
challenged, see C. Herman Pritchett, Congress versus the Supreme Court, 1957-1960 (Minnesota
1961); William M. Beaney and Edward N. Beiser, Prayer and Politics:The Impact of Engel and
Schempp on the Political Process, 13 J Pub L 475, 491-503 (1964); Roger A. Hanson and Robert
E. Crew, Jr., The Policy Impact of Reapportionment,8 L & Socy Rev 69 (1973); Roger Handberg
and Harold F Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals,and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court
versus Congress, 14 L & Socy Rev 309 (1980); Janet S. Lindgren, Beyond Cases: Reconsidering
Judicial Review, 1983 Wis L Rev 583; Stefanie A. Lindquist and David A. Yalof Congressional
Reponses to FederalCircuit Court Decisions, 85 Judicature 60 (2001).
21 See, for example, Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies (Free
Press 1968) (examining judicial-administrative politics and suggesting a model of mutual influence); James F Spriggs, If, Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court
Opinions, 50 Polit Rsrch Q 567 (1997) (arguing that the absence of agency defiance of Court
decisions is the result of interdependencies between the two bodies); Ruth Ann Watry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation:The Aftermath of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
(LFB Scholarly 2002) (showing that, contrary to what many scholars believed, Supreme Court
deference to agency decisions has increased since Chevron). For the effect on agencies of decisions by lower federal courts, see Robert M. Howard and David C. Nixon, Regional Court Influence over Bureaucratic Policymaking: Courts, Ideological Preferences, and the Internal Revenue
Service, 55 Polit Rsrch Q 907 (2002); Brandice Canes-Wrone, BureaucraticDecisions and the
Composition of Lower Courts, 47 Am J Polit Sci 205 (2003).
22
For studies analyzing lower court compliance with Supreme Court decisions, particularly
high profile decisions, see Charles A. Johnson, Lower Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions:A Quantitative Examination,23 Am J Polit Sci 792 (1979); Donald R. Songer and Reginald
S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W Polit Q 297 (1990); Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon
P.Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional
Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis L Rev 369; Sara C. Benesh and Malia Reddick, Overruled:An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme CourtAlteration of Precedent, 64 J Polit 534 (2002).
23 For analysis of the responses of state supreme courts to U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
see Bradley C. Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a US. Supreme Court Civil Liberties
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zations such as schools and universities,24 police departments,2 and busi-

nesses,' and mass public opinion." Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow
Hope2 brought new attention to impact studies, perhaps at long last
carrying the central message of such studies into the law schools, and
it reignited controversies over how best to study the impact of court
decisions and what questions we should ask about how law matters in
society.'9
Decision, 8 L & Socy Rev 109 (1973); G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Impact and State Supreme Courts
(Heath 1977); Donald R. Songer, Alternate Approaches to the Study of Judicial Impact. Miranda
in Five State Courts, 16 Am Polit Q 425 (1988); Helena Silverstein, Road Closed: Evaluating the
JudicialBypass Provisionof the PennsylvaniaAbortion ControlAct, 24 L & Soc Inq 73 (1999).
24 For the limited reach of Supreme Court decisions on education, see Robert H. Birkby,
The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the Schempp Decision, 10 Midwest
J Polit Sci 304 (1966); Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond, The School PrayerDecisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago 1971); John Gruhl and Susan Welch, The
Impact of the Bakke Decision on Black and Hispanic Enrollment in Medical and Law Schools, 71
Soc Sci Q 458 (1990); Jon B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn't: College Hate Speech Codes and
the Two Faces of Legal Compliance,35 L & Socy Rev 345 (2001).
25 For analysis of police department reaction to and implementation of Supreme Court
decisions, see Richard J. Medalie, Leonard Zeitz, and Paul Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Mich L Rev 1347 (1968);
Neal A. Milner, The Court and Local Law Enforcement: The Impact of Miranda (Sage 1971);
James P.Levine, Implementing Legal Policies Through Operant Conditioning:The Case of Police
Practices,6 L & Socy Rev 195 (1971); Stephen Wasby, Small Town Police and the Supreme Court:
Hearing the Word (Heath 1976); Jon B. Gould and Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches:
Assessing Police Behavior Under the US. Constitution, 3 Criminology & Pub Policy 315 (2004).
26 For the responses of businesses to particular Supreme Court decisions, see James P.
Levine, Constitutional Law and Obscene Literature:An Investigation of Bookseller Censorship
Practices, in Theodore L. Becker and Malcolm M. Feeley, eds, The Impact of Supreme Court
Decisions: Empirical Studies 119 (Oxford 2d ed 1973); Jon R. Bond and Charles A. Johnson,
Implementing a Permissive Policy: HospitalAbortion Services After Roe v. Wade, 26 Am J Polit
Sci 1 (1982); Lauren Bowen, Attorney Advertising in the Wake of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
(1977):A Study of Judicial Impact,23 Am Polit Q 461 (1995). For a more general examination of
how businesses internalized the statutory and judicial civil rights mandates of the 196 0s, see
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and OrganizationalGovernance:The Expansion of Due
Process in the American Workplace, 95 Am J Soc 1401 (1990).
27
For empirical evidence of the effect of Supreme Court decisions on public opinion, see
Charles H. Franklin and Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court,
Public Opinion,and Abortion, 83 Am Polit Sci Rev 751 (1989); Roy B. Flemming, John Bohte,
and B. Dan Wood, One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court's Influence on Attentiveness to
Issues in the United States, 1947-92, 41 Am J Polit Sci 1224 (1997); Timothy R. Johnson and Andrew D. Martin, The Public's ConditionalResponse to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 Am Polit Sci
Rev 299 (1998); Valerie J. Hoekstra, Public Reaction to Supreme Court Decisions (Cambridge
2003).
28 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago 1991) (examining the role of the Court in the political system, and arguing that the Court is
largely ineffective in independently producing significant social reform).
29
For a sample of the disagreements surrounding Rosenberg's book, see David A. Schultz,
ed, Leveraging the Law (Peter Lang 1998); Bryant G. Garth and Austin Sarat, eds, How Does
Law Matter? (Northwestern 1998). For a recent introduction to the literature on judicial impact,
see Bradley C. Canon and Charles A. Johnson, JudicialPolicies:Implementation and Impact (CQ
2d ed 1999).
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As the subtitle of Pickerill's book indicates, one aspect of his
study is to assess "the impact of judicial review in a separated system" -specifically, the impact on Congress. One expects judicial review to defeat the legislature's policy preferences. When the Court
wields the judicial veto, Congress is stopped in its tracks. This assumption has driven a great deal of literature about judicial review. The
primary starting point for normative theorizing about judicial review
is that "when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of rep'
resentatives of the actual people of the here and now." Theorists then

turned to considering whether such an absolute veto was valuable and
how it should best be used. Congress might seek to overturn the

Court's decision by amending the Constitution, but the difficulty of
successfully negotiating the Article V process is well known and so
this possibility has been largely ignored.3' The difficulty of a constructive response might lead Congress down the grim path of legislative

reprisals against the Court, and some scholars have examined this response empirically.32 But the Court usually weathers those storms, and
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 16-17 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
31 But see Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court
Constitutional Decisions:The Case of Roosevelt's Court-PackingPlan, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 45
(1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court reversed course because the 1936 elections made possible a constitutional amendment). Congressional overrides of judicial interpretations of statutes
also have received attention. See, for example, Harry P. Stumpf, CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J Pub L 377 (1965) (examining
congressional proposals to reverse decisions between 1957 and 1961 and finding common factors
for successful proposals); Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme
Court Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J L, Econ, & Org
263 (1990) (offering a model which predicts that congressional inaction will follow Supreme
Court decisions because the Court is already responsive to the electorate and takes into account
changes in Congress and the executive branch); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 Yale L J 331 (1991) (finding that for all its monitoring of the Court, Congress overrides only a few decisions, and arguing for increased congressional monitoring); Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional
Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 Temple L Rev 425 (1992) (concluding that
Congress modifies Court decisions at a greater rate than previously understood but finding that
there are few identifiable patterns in the types of decisions Congress overrules); Jeb Barnes,
Overruled?: Legislative Overrides,Pluralism,and Contemporary Court-CongressRelations (Stanford 2004) (analyzing the interaction between Congress and the Supreme Court and finding that
most conflict occurs when issues affect the federal budget directly or when the issue has traditionally divided judges along partisan lines). At the state level, constitutions are easier to amend,
and this is a more relevant option after the exercise of judicial review. See, for example, Douglas
S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism:Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 Rutgers L J 871 (1999).
32 See Pritchett, Congress versus the Supreme Court (cited in note 20); Walter F. Murphy,
Congressand the Court: A Case Study in the American PoliticalProcess (Chicago 1962) (detailing
the causes and the course of the conflict between Congress and the Court in Warren-era decisions between 1954 and 1959); Stuart S. Nagel, Court-CurbingPeriods in American History, 18
30
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students of judicial politics have suggested that when confronted with

a disagreeable statute the Court can simply "move into constitutional
mode" and impose its will on Congress."
One of the central questions in Constitutional Deliberation in

Congress is whether the judicial veto is really as absolute as it is often
assumed to be. Pickerill concludes that "while judicial review can be a
roadblock to legislation, it is often more of a speed bump or detour"

(p 31). This is not a new suggestion, but it has most often taken the
form of an argument that Congress can and does engage the Court in
a "dialogue" about the proper content of constitutional law." Of most
direct relevance, in a large-scale statistical study, James Meernik and
Joseph Ignagni concluded that "contrary to popular and scholarly

opinion, the Congress can and does attempt to reverse Supreme Court
rulings [invalidating federal law, state law, or executive orders]. Judicial review does not appear to be equivalent to judicial finality."3 Instead, "coordinate construction or something akin to it is alive and
functioning in the United States government,"" with Congress frequently "reinterpret[ing] the Constitution after a High Court ruling"
and "challeng[ing] the power of the High Court" by simple statute. 7
This was a remarkable conclusion, but the authors offered little detail

about the bills that they coded as reversing judicial review and thus
rewriting constitutional law.
Pickerill's analysis is straightforward, detailed, and persuasive.
Starting with every federal statute struck down by the Supreme Court
between 1953 and 1997, he looks for any law that "established,
Vand L Rev 925 (1965) (analyzing the factors correlated with the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of Court-curbing bills); John R. Schmidhauser and Larry L. Berg, The Supreme Court and Congress: Conflict and Interaction, 1945-1968 134-84 (Free Press 1972) (finding that ideological
considerations play an important role in congressional behavior toward the Court and suggesting
that the rise of the anti-New Deal Conservative Coalition in Congress imperiled the Court). For
studies on the Court's anticipation of congressional reaction, see Handberg and Hill, 14 L &
Socy Rev 309 (cited in note 20); Gerald N. Rosenberg, JudicialIndependence and the Reality of
PoliticalPower, 54 Rev Polit 369 (1992); Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make
139-45 (CQ 1998); Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of
JudicialReview, 1 Intl J Const L 446 (2003).
33 Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 Am Polit Sci Rev 28,42 (1997) (finding that the Court rarely adjusts to changes in the
composition of Congress). See also William Lasser, The Limits of Judicial Power: The Supreme
Court in American Politics(North Carolina 1988) (analyzing the history of the Court and arguing
that it can weather political storms).
34 See, for example, Louis Fisher, ConstitutionalDialogues: Interpretationas PoliticalProcess (Princeton 1988); Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of
the Supreme Court,8 J L & Polit 143 (1991).
35 James Meernik and Joseph Ignagni, Judicial Review and CoordinateConstruction of the
Constitution,41 Am J Polit Sci 447,458 (1997).
36
Id at 459.
37 Idat 458.
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amended, or repealed the provisions of the statute reviewed by the
Court" and examines "whether the action represented a response to
the Court, and if so, what sort of response" (p 39).38 He then catego-

rizes the congressional response to each invalidated statutory provision as either no response, a repeal, an amended statute, a repeal combined with the passage of a new law, or a constitutional amendment.
Less systematically, Pickerill also characterizes the nature of such legislative responses to the exercise of judicial review. Thus, he is able to
provide a comprehensive assessment of the impact of judicial review
on federal law for the latter half of the twentieth century.
The details of his findings are worthy of note. The median time
between the passage of a statute and its nullification by the Court was
just under ten years, while Congress took a median of nearly four
years to respond (when it did respond) to the judicial invalidation
(pp 42-43). Given these lags, it is perhaps not surprising that most of
the Rehnquist Court cases that invalidated federal laws did not elicit a
congressional response within the time studied (p 43) . The Rehnquist
Court may be extraordinarily effective in blocking congressional policies, but probably not to the degree that Pickerill's numbers might at
first glance suggest. ' Overall, Congress neglected to respond or decided
to simply repeal the affected policy in just over half the cases in the
overall sample, but a majority of those failures to respond involved "as
applied" challenges to federal actions where an executive adjustment
might be more appropriate than a legislative one (pp 42, 46). Congress
acted to "save" the underlying policy in 48 percent of the cases examined (p 42). Only once did this involve a constitutional amendment,
the Twenty-Sixth in response to Oregon v Mitchell" (pp 47-48). When
the Court struck down a federal law, Congress's most common response was simply to amend the statute to work around the constitutional obstacle (p 42). "
Pickerill's assessment of statutory revisions runs through December 2000.
Pickerill reports "no response" to 77.8 percent of the Rehnquist Court's invalidations,
compared to a relatively meager 22.7 percent for the Warren Court and 26.5 percent for the
Burger Court (p 43).
40 Even when leaving fairly clear paths available for a legislative response to its rulings, the
Rehnquist Court's invalidation of federal statutes has effectively disrupted some lawmaking
coalitions. See, for example, John Dinan, CongressionalResponses to the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions,32 Publius 1 (Summer 2002).
41 400 US 112 (1970) (striking down the Voting Rights Act of 1970 provision, which lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen for state and local elections). See US Const
Amend XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age.').
42
Congress amended the statute in 36 percent of the cases. This is the most populated
category next to "no response" (p 42).
38
39
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While a congressional response to judicial review might suggest
an active interbranch dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution,
Pickerill concludes this is very rarely the right way to characterize
congressional action. Instead, Congress amends "legislation in a manner that makes clear concessions to the Court's decision" (p 49).
Congress rarely has an interest in challenging how the Court has
understood the Constitution or in trying to influence the path of judicial doctrine. To the extent that congressional interests are affected by
the Court's action, legislators and lobbyists are most concerned with
figuring out how to comply with the new constitutional environment
and avoid further judicial entanglements. Thus, after a successful due
process challenge to the eligibility requirements of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, '4 "Congress paid close attention to the language from the written opinions of the Court decision, and crafted a
revision that appeared to satisfy the demands of the Court" (p 54).
Pickerill's explanation for this dynamic is quite plausible-that
Congress and the Court primarily care about and act on different
"policy" dimensions (p 36). The justices on the Supreme Court may
have preferences primarily on a "constitutional policy" dimension.
They care directly about the scope of free speech, the structure of the
separation of powers, the etiquette of federalism, and the procedures
followed in the criminal justice process, and they act effectively to impose these policy preferences on other actors in the political system.
Most politicians, by contrast, have preferences primarily on a "public
policy" dimension (p 37). They may care little about free speech, separation of powers, or federalism per se, but they care a great deal about
crime, federal spending, and welfare policy, as well as their associated
electoral consequences. Most analyses of judicial review assume a
zero-sum game-if the Court "wins" by invalidating a statute, then the
legislature necessarily "loses." Instead, Pickerill suggests that most of
the Court's review of federal statutes is better understood as "winwin," with both the Court and Congress capable of getting what they
want because they want different things. The Court is able to announce the constitutional law it wants, but Congress is usually able to
work within those doctrinal constraints to achieve most of the public
policy results it wants.
If this two-dimensional tango between Congress and the Court is
in fact common, then this should have important implications for how
we think about judicial review. It should give us a clue to why the po43 See United States Department of Agriculture v Murry, 413 US 508 (1973) (striking down
a provision that made a family ineligible for food stamp assistance if someone in the household
was declared as a dependent on someone else's tax return).
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litical response to the judicial invalidation of federal statutes is often
so tepid, and thus why judicial review has been politically sustainable.
Most of the time, Pickerill's evidence suggests, judicial review does not
really impinge upon important congressional interests.' This tango
may also offer an explanation for why judicial invalidations sometimes
do become politically salient, by directing our attention to those instances when the Court really does impede congressional policy interests or when Congress really does care about constitutional law. It
highlights the ambiguity in the standard shorthand of the empirical
judicial politics literature-that judges seek to advance their "policy
preferences" (which in turn is thought to make judicial policymaking
continuous with legislative policymaking). 5 At the same time, it gives
reason to doubt the ready assumption in the normative literature that
judicial review creates a countermajoritarian difficulty by obstructing
and displacing the policy preferences of electoral and legislative majorities.
Pickerill does not explore this implication of his research or elaborate on the two-dimensional quality of the judicial-legislative interaction in great detail, but his work provides good reason for taking seriously the possibility of "win-win" outcomes. Pickerill has left it for
future researchers to look more closely at how much of its policy preference Congress is ultimately able to salvage after the exercise of
judicial review. It may well be the case that "legislative sequels". "enable[] the legislative purpose to be substantially carried out, albeit by
somewhat different means," as one study of Charter dialogue between
courts and legislatures in Canada has suggested." The fact that mere
statutory amendment is the most frequent active response to judicial
invalidation may suggest that this is the case (p 42). But statutory
amendments may significantly alter the policy Congress is able to pur44 This might be true for other reasons as well, such as when the Court reviews minor
statutory provisions or those with little current legislative support. See, for example, Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,6 J Pub
L 279,286-91 (1957) (finding that Congress and the president generally succeed in overcoming a
hostile Court on major policy issues, and that the Court has mostly struck down minor or old
policies); Mark A. Graber, The Non-MajoritarianProblem:Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,
7 Stud in Am Polit Dev 35, 36 (1993) (arguing that judicial review is most often exercised when
the "dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some public dispute"). For
scholarship that suggests judicial review does not conflict with the will of the legislative majority,
see Mark A. Graber, Federalistor Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12
Stud in Am Polit Dev 229 (1998); Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85
BU L Rev (forthcoming 2005).
45
For the standard account from this perspective, see Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J.
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the AttitudinalModel Revisited (Cambridge 2002).
46 Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, The CharterDialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charterof Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 Osgoode Hall L J
75,80-82 (1997).
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sue, and in some instances, such as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 7 the legislative sequel may be a pale imitation of the original.
II. CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION ON THE CONSTITUTION
The second task is emphasized in the title -Constitutional Deliberation in Congress. These two tasks-the impact of judicial review

and congressional deliberation on the Constitution- are related by a
key causal hypothesis that Pickerill advances in this study: judicial
review provokes constitutional deliberation in Congress. This is an
important claim, and I will return to it shortly. But first it is worth noting that Pickerill's detailed account of constitutional debates in Congress in the 1990s is quite valuable on its own.
Constitutional politics, the "Constitution outside the courts," and
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation have received increasing attention in recent years from both political scientists and law professors.
Louis Fisher of the Congressional Research Service has long been a
leading figure in detailing the ways in which constitutional law is
shaped not by the courts alone but by "the constant, creative interplay
between the judiciary and the political system."8 Congress participates
as both a stimulus to constitutional innovation and thinking and as an
author of fundamental legal rules. Likewise, a group of scholars
loosely associated with Princeton University has pursued a variety of
questions associated with constitutional politics and "departmentalism," or the equal authority and obligation of each branch of government to interpret the Constitution. 9 Scholars interested in the relationship between the Constitution, the courts, and American political
development and change, as well as republican political theory, have
given further impetus to the study of constitutional politics and the
ways in which constitutional meaning and practices were developed
outside, as well as inside, the judiciary
47 42 USC § 2000cc.
48 Fisher, ConstitutionalDialogues at 4 (cited in note 34). Pickerill expressly notes that he

is building on Fisher's work (pp 4, 231-74). For an appreciation and bibliography of Fisher's
work up to that point, see Robert J. Spitzer, ed, Politics and Constitutionalism(SUNY 2000).
49 See Edward S.Corwin, Court over Constitution:A Study of Judicial Review as an Instrument of Popular Government 6-7 (Peter Smith 1957) (first published by Princeton in 1938). For a
collection of essays reflecting the recent concerns of this group, see Sotirios A. Barber and
Robert P. George, eds, ConstitutionalPolitics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and
Change (Princeton 2001).
50 See, for example, Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L J 1493 (1988)
(examining the claims of those who would reconsider the Constitution in light of the civic republican strain of the founding era and its majoritarian implications for constitutional interpretation); Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations (Belknap 1991) (arguing for a dualist
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The Supreme Court itself has helped make the study of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, and particularly the question of judicial supremacy, a boom industry since the late 1990s. From different
ends of the ideological spectrum, the Court recently has been emphatic in asserting the supremacy of its authority to interpret the Constitution and the primacy of its own understandings of that document's requirements. Of course, this has been characteristic of the Supreme Court in the second half of the twentieth century. Encouraged
by President Dwight Eisenhower's repeated declarations of judicial
supremacy and backed by his willingness to deploy federal troops on
its behalf, the Court gave a new gloss on Marbury v Madison as establishing that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution" and that the enunciations of the Court are
equivalent to the Constitution itself. 1 The Court soon found reason to
emphasize its status as the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"
not only to the states, 2 but also to Congress 3 and the president." In
Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey," the Court
instructed the critics of Roe v Wade that it must "speak before all others for their constitutional ideals" 6 in order to call "the contending
sides in a national controversy to end their national division."5 In its
federalism decisions the justices have more directly insisted that the
Court must be "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text. ''
Some scholars have responded by elaborating on the argument for

democracy in which the Constitution may be amended through political action other than Article V processes); Graber, 7 Stud in Am Polit Dev 35 (cited in note 44); Stephen M. Griffin,
American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton 1996); Keith E. Whittington,
ConstitutionalConstruction:Divided Powers and ConstitutionalMeaning (Harvard 1999) (distinguishing the political Constitution from the legal one and presenting a conception of the Constitution as dependent on political actors).
51 Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958) (holding that Little Rock could not delay in implementing the desegregation mandate). On the political context for this pronouncement, see
Keith E. Whittington, The Court as the FinalArbiter of the Constitution:Cooper v. Aaron (1958),
in Gregg Ivers and Kevin T. McGuire, eds, Creating ConstitutionalChange 9 (Virginia 2004).
52
Baker v Carr,369 US 186, 211 (1962) (holding that vote dilution claims were justiciable
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
53
See Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969) (holding that the House of Representatives has no authority to deny membership to any person duly elected by his constituents).
54 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974) (holding that the president does not have
an absolute, unqualified privilege of immunity from judicial processes under all circumstances).
55 505 US 833 (1992).
56
Id at 868 (majority).
57 Id at 867.
58
United States v Morrison,529 US 598, 616 n 7 (2000) (striking down a law that created a
civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence because it did not involve economic activity or interstate commerce or state action).
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judicial supremacy." Others have responded by calling for some form
of "popular constitutionalism,"

for "legislative" and "policentric"

constitutionalism,' or even for "taking the Constitution away from the
courts" completely. '
In his book, Pickerill provides a close study of the extent and
quality of congressional deliberation on the constitutional issues raised

by statutes that stretched federal authority. Pickerill provides four
brief case studies from the 1990s, drawing on the public record and on
the statements of more than forty interviewees (mostly congressional
staffers, but also members of Congress, lobbyists, journalists, executive
branch officials, and a federal judge) who were involved in those deliberations. The case studies are the Gun-Free School Zones Act of

1990,'3the Brady Bill in 1993,64 the Violence Against Women Act in

1994,6' and the Hate Crimes Billr from the late 1990s. Of course, the
statutes at the center of three of these case studies would eventually

run afoul of the Rehnquist Court's federalism offensive;"7 the Hate
Crimes Bill was never passed into law.

Federalism holds a particular attraction for Pickerill because it
provides an opportunity to observe congressional deliberation in the
59
See, for example, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,110 Harv L Rev 1359 (1997) (defending judicial supremacy on the ground
that settlement of contested issues can only be achieved by having an authoritative interpreter
whose interpretations bind all others).
60
See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review (Oxford 2004) (arguing for a theory of constitutional interpretation which preserves the
active sovereignty of the people over the Constitution).
61
See Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L J 1943 (2003)
(proposing a model of constitutional interpretation which attributes equal interpretive power to
Congress and the Court).
62
See Mark Tushnet, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts (Princeton 1999) (suggesting a populist constitutional law that would deny the Court any role in constitutional interpretation).
63
Pub L No 101-647, 104 Stat 4844, codified at 18 USC § 922(q) (2000), amended by Pub L
No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-368 (1996).
64 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub L No 103-159, 107 Stat 1541 (1993), codified at 18 USC § 922(s) (2000).
65
Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 1941, codified at 42 USC § 13981 (2000).
66 The legislation was introduced in response to the murder of James Byrd by white supremacists in Texas. The House Judiciary Committee held hearings on HR 3081 on July 22, 1998,
see Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997, Hearings on HR 3081 Before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1998), and the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on
S 1529 on July 8, 1998, see Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998, Hearing on S 1529 Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1998), but there is no bill at the time
Pickerill writes (p 171 n 2).
67
See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones
Act); Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997) (invalidating a provision of the Brady Bill); Morrison, 529 US 598 (striking down the Violence Against Women Act).
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presence and in the absence of judicial scrutiny. Before getting to the
1990s, Pickerill looks at congressional deliberation in "the shadows of
uncertain scrutiny" earlier in American history (ch 3). Here he looks
particularly at the debate over the Child Labor Act" in the early twentieth century, a time when the Court was fairly active in enforcing limits
on federal power, and compares it to the debate surrounding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,9 when the Court was presumably more deferential
(pp 73-94). The 1990s then provide an opportunity to consider congressional deliberation "in the darkness of judicial deference" (ch 4),
though by the late 1990s the Court appears to be rather active again
(p 95). Pickerill posits that congressional deliberation on constitutional issues will be more likely when the Court is relatively active in
reviewing the legislature's handiwork and when the bill at issue is controversial enough that there will be a mobilized opposition to raise
constitutional objections (pp 64-67). Given the incentives facing legislators, "constitutional issues are not an automatic item on the legislator's checklist when drafting and considering bills" (p 67). For lowsalience bills that generate little controversy, no one on Capitol Hill is
likely to take the time to vet their constitutionality. As with so much in
Congress, members rely on those who might be hurt by a legislative
proposal to raise the alarm. Legislators can reasonably assume that
serious problems that will negatively affect their constituents will be
called to their attention; they have neither the time nor the interest to
go looking for problems. As Pickerill observes, "Supreme Court caselaw or doctrine can create a 'constitutional context' for debate and
deliberation over proposed legislation" (p 67). Political controversy
creates incentives for opponents of legislation to exploit that context
to initiate a constitutional debate.
The Court itself, when abandoning judicial enforcement, offered
assurances that the "political safeguards of federalism" would be sufficient to ensure that legislators were appropriately conscientious of
their constitutional obligations in that area." Pickerill suggests that,
68 Child Labor Act of 1916, Pub L No 64-249,39 Stat 675, invalidated by Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 US 251 (1918).
69 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1971 (2000), upheld by
Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294 (1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v United States, 379
US 241 (1964).
70 For an early analysis of this dynamic in the context of congressional oversight, see
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Polit Sci 165 (1984). For a proposal for congressional reform to
address this problem with regard to constitutional issues, see Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, InstitutionalDesign of a Thayerian Congress,50 Duke L J 1277 (2001).
71 For a case in which the Court offered such assurances, see Garciav San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 551-52 (1985) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act
appropriately applied to state and local governmental entities). See also Herbert Wechsler, The
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whatever merits that argument might have, it ignores the critical role
that judicial review itself played in making those safeguards effective.
Defenders of federalism need both the authority of the Court to lend
legitimacy to their concerns and the stick of judicial review to force
legislators to take their concerns seriously. Unlike with many modern
constitutional constraints, such as free speech, the Court gave Congress a green light to ignore federalism concerns for several decadesbefore suddenly signaling that more caution was required. The resurgence of interest on the Court in the enforcement of federalism in the
1990s provides a natural experiment by varying the constitutional context that is thought to condition congressional deliberation.72
Pickerill's case studies generally support his claim that the threat
of judicial review is a necessary condition for serious constitutional
deliberation in Congress. Constitutional argumentation in Congress
over the Child Labor Act was intense, but it was virtually absent
from deliberations on the Gun-Free Schools Zones Act, the Brady
Bill, and the Violence Against Women Act, even though these proposals attracted political controversy (pp 93, 126). In the wake of the
Rehnquist Court decisions of the mid-1990s, however, the Hate Crimes
Bill did run into federalism-based objections, among other complaints
(pp 123-25). The post-New Deal Civil Rights Act was a mixed case,
but even proponents of the legislation were concerned about how the
Court might view the law and thus tried to square it with established
constitutional doctrine (pp 84-91).
Pickerill's case is not airtight. One might reasonably think that
unobserved forces move both judges and legislators either to take
seriously or to dismiss concerns about the scope of national power, or
even that the causal arrows run in the other direction such that the
Supreme Court's interest in federalism is conditioned on prior politi-

Political Safeguards of Federalism:The Rble of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954) (arguing that it is Congress and not the Court
that is vested with the ultimate authority for managing federalism); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism,100 Colum L Rev 215 (2000) (arguing
that the political system has protected federalism and that the Court's foray into federalism is
unnecessary and misguided).
72
If Pickerill is correct, however, it should be possible to observe differences in the level of
constitutional deliberation in Congress on issues of constant judicial concern, such as free
speech, depending on the level of controversy surrounding the legislation. In theory, uncontroversial legislation might slide through Congress (or be buried in committee) without salient free
speech considerations ever being raised, even if the courts have provided the doctrinal arsenal
for raising such objections. In practice, given the mobilized lobby around such issues at the national level, the very existence of constitutional problems may be sufficient to render a bill controversial. Pickerill does not effectively test the relative controversy dimension of his theory
since nearly all of his case studies involve fairly high-profile and contested proposals.
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cal interest in the issue. 3 Politicians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seem to have raised the issues of federalism and states'
rights independent of the threat of judicial review, but it is admittedly
hard to know given that the threat was often there. In an earlier study
of constitutional deliberation in Congress, Donald Morgan argued
that Congress as an institution changed around the time of the New
Deal." Where politicians once accepted the Jeffersonian "view that
legislatures have a strong responsibility for the independent decision
of constitutional questions,"75 they had since given in to Marshall's
view that such questions were to be resolved by the courts and the
legislators should "lean on the courts and neglect an independent inquiry" into the Constitution." For the contemporary period, Pickerill
himself has elsewhere detailed how the "Rehnquist Court's foray into
federalism" was prefigured by Republican party politics. Too close
attention to the debates surrounding these particular statutes may
obscure legislative and political attention to federalism taking place in
the background.7 8
Nonetheless, Pickerill is surely right that the Supreme Court's
case law reduced the salience of federalism considerations when Congress took up proposals such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and
his detailed case studies show the low level of consideration Congress
gave to those issues and explain why. For such measures, objectionsconstitutional or otherwise-were overwhelmed by the political symbolism of the vote. When a senator was holding up the bill, committee
staff simply responded, "okay fine, go down to the floor and vote
against it-we're going to force a vote" (p 99), which cleared the way
for its incorporation without a recorded vote into the larger crime
control bill. In these case studies, even opponents of the bills looked
73 See Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural
Foundationsof Federalism,25 Hastings Const L 0 483 (1998) (detailing the changing ideological
and socioeconomic supports for federalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); Keith E.
Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's FederalismOffensive, 51 Duke L
J 477 (2001) (relating the Rehnquist Court's increasing activity on federalism to the favorable
political conditions for such activism).
74 Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution:A Study of Responsibility (Belknap
1966).
75
Id at 332.
76
Id at 333. This narrative has been recently revived by Larry Kramer. See Kramer, The
People Themselves (cited in note 60).
77 J. Mitchell Pickerill and Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism,2 Perspectives on Polit 233 (2004) (arguing that competing jurisprudential
theories over the role of the Court illustrate divisions within the current political regime).
78
See, for example, Keith E. Whittington, HearingAbout the Constitution in Congressional
Committee, in Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington, eds, Congress and the Constitution (Duke
forthcoming 2005) (examining congressional committees through the lens of public hearings and
finding that congressional deliberation on constitutional issues is fairly routine).
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elsewhere for persuasive arguments to marshal against them. For while
some legislators might have been "adamant about a sort of philosophical federalism based opposition" (p 122), most were more impressed by the fact that "historically the Court had been deferential to
Congress on these issues" (p 122), and that was enough to minimize
the salience of constitutional arguments."
Pickerill's exploration of the negotiations behind the federal commandeering of local law enforcement to conduct background checks on
gun buyers, rejected by the Court in Printz v United States, exposes
yet another intriguing dynamic. The primary opponents of the Brady
Bill were more focused on the individual rights issues associated with
gun ownership than on federalism. Indeed, the provision struck down in
Printz was the work of the National Rifle Association and its allies,
who came up with it as a way to head off a long waiting period for
prospective gun buyers that seemed destined for passage (pp 108-09).
Once the political coalition behind the bill was put in place and the
necessary compromises made, no one was interested in destabilizing
the deal by raising new constitutional problems. Even after some initial rumblings from the courts, Congress tended to see itself as "dealing within the bounds of stuff that Congress has already done" (p 135)
and thus not dealing with issues that required serious constitutional
deliberation.
In the workaday world of passing legislation, constitutional deliberation is not high on the agenda. As one senator noted in ranking the
considerations for moving bills through the legislative process, "Policy
issues first, how do you get a consensus to pass the bill, six other
things, then constitutionality" (p 134). Or as one congressman observed, "When I go home and talk to my constituents, they ask me to
help solve problems in Congress. They don't ask if it's constitutional.
They want common sense" (p 134). From the Supreme Court's perspective, this is precisely the problem, and exactly the reason Congress
deserves little deference when the Court reviews the constitutionality
of its policies. Many legislators are likely to agree, expecting the courts
to focus on the technicalities of constitutional fidelity and to correct
any errors that the policymakers might have made (pp 135-36).1
79 Congressional staff working on the Brady Bill did not know what to make of the Court's
renewed interest in federalism. As one staffer was quoted, "[T]here hadn't been any Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence in two hundred years. Now there's this case [New York v United
States], this is just likely to be a blip, you know, an anomaly" (p 114).
80 521 US 898 (1997).
81 See also Bruce Peabody, CongressionalAttitudes Toward ConstitutionalInterpretation,in
Devins and Whittington, eds, Congress and the Constitution (cited in note 78) (reporting the results
of a survey of attitudes of congressmen to the relative roles of the Court and Congress in interpreting the Constitution).
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For many of those interested in constitutional deliberation in
Congress, Pickerill's conclusions may be disheartening. The modem
Congress portrayed in these pages is certainly not the one that once
included James Madison and heard the first great debates over the
meaning of the U.S. Constitution. In Pickerill's account, the legislative
interest in constitutional issues is narrow and largely strategic, If legislators are concerned about their handiwork surviving judicial scrutiny,
then they will have an interest in anticipating what judges will want
and in satisfying those expectations." Active judicial review might encourage Congress to deliberate on the constitutionality of its legislation. This will at least lead Congress to be somewhat careful about
constitutional requirements and will reduce the problem of Congress
thoughtlessly violating the Constitution. This will not, however, lead
Congress to think about the meaning of the Constitution independently; it will not force Congress to develop understandings different
from those promulgated by the judges. Constitutional deliberation in
Congress will not be populist and aggressive, but technical and deferential- an echo of the courts, not an alternative center of legislative
constitutionalism. Congress, in Pickerill's account, is not so much interested in getting the Constitution right as in anticipating what the
judges will do. When it comes to constitutional law, legislators are
Oliver Wendell Holmes's paradigmatic "bad man.83

Pickerill finds that Congress might be attentive to the Constitution under some conditions, but he finds little evidence that Congress
actually does deliberate on constitutional meaning. Even when legislators address constitutional issues in these case studies, they rarely argue about constitutional values, attempt to develop new constitutional
understandings, or mobilize behind innovative constitutional claims.
For purposes of the study, Pickerill identifies "deliberation" with "reflection and debate over the scope of federal powers under the Constitution in the context of legislation" (p 11), though even "reflection"
82 In some circumstances, legislators might not care whether their legislation survives
judicial review, in which case even the threat of judicial review will not lead to serious judicial
deliberation. One of Pickerill's lobbyists takes this view: "What they want is to be able to tell
their constituents that they got a bill passed.... When legislation is struck down by the courts, it
does not hurt the politician politically. [The politician can say] the courts did that. It's too bad,
but that's the way it goes" (p 136). On this dynamic, see also Whittington, 51 Duke L J at 512-15
(cited in note 73).
83
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457,460-61 (1897):
What constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you that it is something
different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or England ....But if we
take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for
the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English
courts are likely to do in fact.
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and "debate" seem a bit strong given the evidence presented. In an
earlier study of constitutional deliberation in Congress, Susan Burgess
identified multiple levels of "constitutional consciousness" measuring
how engaged Congress might be with constitutional meaning and how
much it distinguishes between judicial interpretations of the Constitution and the Constitution itself.i In her terms, Pickerill's legislators are
operating at the lowest levels of constitutional consciousness, at best
recognizing and deferring to what they take to be the authoritative
interpretations of the Supreme Court. A similar dynamic has developed in other democracies that have adopted judicial review. Where
constitutional review is active and available, parliaments will "engage
in structured deliberations of the constitutionality of legislative proposals," but only in order to avoid a judicial veto and with the effect of
institutionalizing judicial supremacy in the articulation of constitutional meaning." Rather than a genuine political dialogue about constitutional meaning emerging, the legislature simply "subordinate[s] its
understanding of constitutionally permissible policy to that articulated
by a court." By contrast, Pickerill would suggest that at least the judiciary and legislature manage together to produce "a more careful consideration and articulation of the reasons that justify the statutory
policy" than they would without judicial review (pp 58-61).
This conclusion about extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
generally may be too pessimistic. Pickerill's selection of case studies
from the 1990s is driven by what interested the Court, not what interested Congress. They are, in a sense, cases of congressional failure,
where Congress failed to anticipate the Court and failed to identify
and correct potential constitutional defects in its legislation. There are
certainly other instances in which legislators have a positive desire to
raise and debate constitutional issues. Some of those debates take
place in the shadow of active judicial review, such as abortion, affirmative action, or same-sex marriage. Others take place in the absence of
any expectation of judicial review, such as war powers or impeachment. It seems likely that congressional deliberation would have looked
different if Pickerill had focused on individual rights, because those
constitutional questions can have a political immediacy that may be
absent in second-order issues of structure and process such as federalism.

84 Susan R. Burgess, Contest for ConstitutionalAuthority: The Abortion and War Powers
Debates 24 (Kansas 1992).
85 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: ConstitutionalPolitics in Europe 73 (Oxford
2000).
86 Christopher P. Manfredi and James B. Kelly, Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to
Hogg and Bushell, 37 Osgoode Hall L J 513,522 (1999).
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Even federalism, however, may be the subject of congressional
discussion, if not necessarily in the specific context of these statutes.
Pickerill presents, for example, a suggestive chart of an increasing
number of federalism references in the CongressionalRecord over the
course of the 1990s (p 120). He conjectures that the increase is attributable to the Court's decisions on federalism, and his case study reveals that United States v LopeZ' clearly influenced the drafting and
debating of the Hate Crimes Bill (pp 119, 123-24). However, if his
case studies show that there was little consideration of federalism
when statutes such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act were being
drafted, his chart shows that there were nonetheless hundreds of references to federalism in the Congressional Record that must have
been occurring elsewhere. Moreover, while the Rehnquist Court's decisions might have contributed to the increased attention to federalism in congressional deliberations in the late 1990s, the initial large
jump in such discussions took place in the 104th Congress-before
decisions such as Lopez were handed down.8
If federalism was in the air in Congress in the 1990s, an important
question is why it did not have more of an effect on the consideration
of such bills as the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Brady Bill. It
is possible, for example, that while Congress talks a good game about
federalism, and some legislators may care about federalism values in
the abstract, when it comes to passing legislation it truly is politics,
policy, "six other things, then constitutionality" (p 134). In such circumstances, extrajudicial constitutional interpretation may be aimed
in part at creating the conditions under which the courts might take an
active role in defending the values that legislators find themselves
unable to uphold when tempted by politically attractive legislation.
Pickerill's study emphasizes the need for thinking about judicial
review not as a theoretical abstraction but as a concrete reality of the
political process. In showing how Congress anticipates and responds
to the actions of the Court, he illuminates the importance and consequence of judicial review as well as the politics of the legislative
branch. Somewhat surprisingly, he shows how judicial supremacy (or,
in Pickerill's words, "judicial primacy") in constitutional interpretation
may sit comfortably with substantial legislative discretion in policymaking, and how an active judiciary may be useful not only in getting
politicians to adhere to constitutional requirements, but also in prod514 US 549 (1995).
See Whittington, HearingAbout the Constitution (cited in note 78). Barry Friedman and
Anna Harvey contend that it was the Republican victory in 1994 that sparked the Court to begin
striking down congressional statutes at such a torrid pace in the late 1990s. See Barry Friedman
and Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court,78 Ind L J 123 (2003).
87
88
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ding them to consider the Constitution. Pickerill calls our attention
not to the great political debates over the Constitution that are recounted in the history books but to the more routine legislative decisions that implicate constitutional law; not to the floor orations of legislative leaders, but to the negotiations of lobbyists and congressional
staff. It is the constitutional deliberation in the warrens of power.

